• Lack of experience within the Local Authority in setting the strategy to achieving Authorisation for Placing into Service (APIS) from the National Safety Authority, the Office of Rail and Road (ORR); potentially leading to delays to Authorisation and the station being bought into use.

• Engagement with internal and external approval bodies had not commenced including the ORR, NRAP, Route SRP, CSM-RA Assessment Body and NTSN Approval Body; which would have again led to significant delays to Authorisation.

• Some elements of the system safety work had not been developed for a period of the station's design activities due to unclear contractual scope between the Local Authority and the Infrastructure Manager who were delivering the Railway Systems work package. Had the situation remained then an unsupportive Safety Assessment Report would have been received by the CSM-RA Assessment Body.

• The hazard transfer process between the railway systems package and impacted Train Operating Companies had not commenced.

• The new Project Authorisation Strategy (PAS) was created, which clearly confirmed the split in scope between the Local Authority new station development and the infrastructure manager railway systems works; helping to confirm the deliverables to be provided by each party as part of the Station being Authorised for Placing into Service from the ORR.
• Detailed System Definition and System Safety Plans were developed to bound the project risk assessment activities and detail the system safety activities to be performed to demonstrate compliance to the CSM-RA regulations and that the station would be safely integrated into the existing railway network.
• The Station Hazard Record was updated with significant levels of detail to ensure that the hazardous events were clearly described and appropriate safety requirements developed; ensuring that one of the project's most important documents would be acceptable to the CSM-RA Assessment Body.  
• Hazard workshops were set up between multiple stakeholders from differing projects, and their designated specialist engineers, in order to identify hazards that would arise from interfacing project elements. Actions were then issued to appropriate engineers, with the sessions helping to outline any oversights in the design.
• In order to help gain acceptance from various stakeholders, a Hazard Identification workshop focused on Fire was held to assure those that the design was optimised for life safety over asset protection. This session gave rise to agreement and contentment between stakeholder groups, helping with the formal acceptance of the design approach.

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