Upon commencing work on the project it was identified that there were a number of challenges surrounding the project:

• Unclear split in Project Authorisation Strategy with seperate works being delivered by the Infrastructure Manager and Local Authority; potentially leading to unclear scope alignment and therefore possible delays to the commissioning of the Railway System elements of the project;
• Stage Works CSM-RA Significance assessment too onerous for works being undertaken which would lead to a significant number of Stage Work Safety Assessment Reports to be produced by the CSM RA Assessment Body (ASBO);

• Strained relationships with ASBO and System Review Panels based on late submissions and concerns over adequate scope coverage;

• Introduction of a new Automatic Half Barrier Level Crossing (first in the Maintenance Delivery Unit area) into a Sidings environment that required 9 derogations based on site constraints, potential for Level Crossing not being accepted by Level Crossing Manager, and any residual risks not being accepted by Train Operating Companies (TOCs);

• Significant mainline track slews to be undertaken to make room for new station island platforms, leading to potential issues surrounding sufficient Staff Protection for maintenance colleagues; 

• Hazard Transfer process not sufficiently implemented with TOCs, potentially leading to residual risks not being accepted and potential commissioning delays;

• Lack of input from Infrastructure Manager Project Engineers and Design Contractor's Responsible Engineers into the resolution of hazardous events captured within the Hazard Record, having the potential therefore that the project would not be able to demonstrate compliance with the applicabel safety requirements and therefore commissioning delays.

• Our Project Authorisation Strategy was able to clearly confirm the split in scope between the infrastructure manager railway systems works and the Local Authority new station development; helping to confirm the deliverables to be provided by each party as part of the Station being Authorised for Placing into Service from the ORR.
• We conducted a re-categorisation process for the stage works of the project, reducing the number of Safety Assessment Reports (SARs) that would need to be delivered by the CSM RA Assessment Body, de-risking commissioning events and saving costs associated with the ASBO.
• Our risk assessment activity for the AHB Level Crossing reduced the number of derogations which required acceptance, with our works being accepted by Major Scheme and Level Crossing Review Panels and the Technical Head of System Safety.
• Our submissions strategy has been clearly developed and communicated to the ASBO with all submission dates being achieved allowing the suitable review periods of the ASBO, demonstrating a controlled approach to the delivery of safety assurance.
• Regular Hazard Record reviews with Project Engineers and Design Contractor's Responsible Engineers enabled sufficient development of safety requirements and inclusion of appropriate compliance statements and evidence referencing for demonstration of risks being reduced so far as resonable practicable.
• Regular Hazard Transfer sessions were held with TOCs in the build up to stage work commissionings to ensure that they were provided with all appropriate evidence and transfer forms in a timely manner to enable TOCs to accept the residual risks and sign the hazard transfer forms.

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